THE MASSACRE.

The Gallant Cavalry Leader's Death Officially Confirmed.

AN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL SHERIDAN.

"A Mistake, for Which He Paid the Penalty of His Life."

SHERMAN ON THE REASONS FOR THE WAR.

A Campaign at the Request of the Indian Department.

THE PRESIDENT DEEPLY AFFECTED

Opinion of Army Officers on the Disastrous Movement.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SITTING BULL.

Sketch of the Indian Campaigns of the Past.

INCEPTION AND PROGRESS OF THE PRESENT WAR.

PHILADELPHIA, July 6, 1876.

As soon as your correspondent heard of the disaster to our troops he visited Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, who is here at the meeting of the Army of the Cumberland. The distinguished officer received the HERALD representative with great courtesy, and said he had read the painful narrative in the morning papers.

Your correspondent asked the General whether he had any news from the field, to which the General replied that he had no news at all. The whole thing was a surprise to him, a mystery, and so incredible that he could not believe it. He was the more surprised because the news came in such a roundabout way. Why were there no narratives in the New York papers from the special correspondents?

Your correspondent called attention to the full despatches that had appeared in the HERALD from the command of Crook, and said that, perhaps, some accident had happened to the scout.

Here another officer called attention to the name of the scout who was reported in the despatch as bringing in the news. His reputation was not such as would justify any one in accepting his story without reserve.

"More than that," said General Sheridan, "if you will analyze the despatch you will see that it comes without any of the marks of credence. It does not come to Headquarters. It does not come to the leading papers from special correspondents. It is not given to the press for telegraphing, but appears first in a Salt Lake and Montana paper. These scouts on the frontier have a way of spreading news, and all frontier stories, especially about Indian wars, are to be very carefully considered."

Your correspondent asked the General if he gave no credence to the news. The General answered that the story was so horrible that he could only accept it when it came officially. Anyhow, when the truth was known, even looking at it from the worst side, it would be found less alarming than is here printed.

Your correspondent asked the General whether his latest news from the expedition gave him any cause for apprehension.

AN INCREDIBLE FEATURE.

The General said that the march as described was the march General Custer intended to make, but even if Custer had fallen into an engagement there would not have been the slaughter here described. That is the incredible feature of the story. A fight was probable and a defeat possible, but no such defeat as is here described.

"When did you last hear from General Custer?" asked your correspondent.

The General said he last heard from Terry on June 21. Terry is in command of the expedition. He was then north of the Rosebud. He had discovered signs of a fresh Indian camp, showing that Indians were in that vicinity. It was his plan then to send General Custer, with his twelve companies of cavalry up the Rosebud and to cross from there over to the Little Horn. You will see from this despatch that the courier reports that it was on the Little Horn that the action is said to have taken place. While Custer was marching up the Rosebud to the Little Horn Terry went with a steamer to the junction of the Big Horn and Little Horn, and ferried General Gibbons' command to the south side of the Yellowstone. You see the Little Horn empties into the Big Horn, and that into the Yellowstone. It was then the purpose of Gibbons to march up the Big Horn and meet Custer, who was coming down. All of this confirming certain features of the news, makes me regard the report with anxiety, but still I am in hopes that it is not true, and at the worst an exaggeration. If true the news should have come more directly.

The General then left to preside over the meeting of the Army of the Cumberland.

THE NEWS.

About three o'clock your correspondent called on the General again, and found him at his room in the Continental. Several officers were with him, and he was reading a long despatch from General Terry. After he had concluded he said, with much feeling, that his news from General Terry confirmed the reports to a certain extent, still they were imperfect despatches with allusions to a report of the details of the action that was on the way, and he had telegraphed for it. Until he received this he could not say what the disaster had been.

Your correspondent asked if this was an official despatch.

The General said it was not. Only a confidential despatch which it was his duty to send to General Sherman. It seems that there was an action, that Custer attacked the Indians, who outnumbered and defeated him, and he was killed.

Your correspondent asked if this despatch confirmed the death of Custer.

STRETCHERS FOR THE WOUNDED.

Yes; Terry says that in so many words. But he also speaks of sending up stretchers for the wounded, which, as I said this morning, shows that there were wounded, and, not as the despatch shows, a complete massacre. It shows that our troops were able to rescue their wounded and retreat with them. The Indian always kills. The fact that Terry speaks of caring for the wounded shows that there was no such complete destruction of the command of Custer. But beyond Custer's death I have no news nor names of the wounded, no details of the action. Those may come at any time.

THE RESPONSIBILITY.

Your correspondent ventured to inquire whether the General had any information as to the cause or the responsibility of the disaster.

The General said, with sorrowful feeling, that it was too soon to pass any judgment upon an action of this extent. It would be unfair to the memory of Custer or of any soldier who loses his life in battle to pass an opinion until the whole story was known. Custer was a gallant, daring man, who knew the Indian country well, who had served against various tribes, and who, in addition to his natural ability and courage, had special experience. The same could be said of General Crook, who was famous for his Indian knowledge.

HOW IT LOOKS.

It now looks, at least that is the impression made upon the mind of General Terry, as if Custer found himself with his command in presence of the Sioux; that without waiting for reserves or reinforcements, or even for the co-operation of the other portions of the command, he made a dash. Instead of capturing and destroying a village, as he probably expected, he found that he had thrown himself upon the main body of the Sioux, 2,000 at least, if our information is accurate. Hence the disaster. This is what General Terry thinks from his information. I only repeat that to you as his opinion, not more. He has all the facts; I merely have his conclusions. That is the situation now. Custer is said to have made this mistake—and a mistake it was, all the more surprising in one who knew the Indian so well—but he pays the penalty with his life.

OUR INDIAN POLICY.

Beyond this general idea of the contents of the Terry despatch, the General would not go. He spoke of Custer with feeling and regard. The conversation then ran into our policy in dealing with the Indians. General Sheridan said that the truth was, the army was made to carry out the purposes of the government in the Indian country by reason of its weakness.

"I have," he said, "sent every man I could spare into that region, even taking troops from Laramie and Salt Lake. The government, in its wisdom, directs the doing of certain things in these regions. It directs an expedition like this of Terry, an expedition necessary for the development of that country. We do the best we can with our material, but we are in no condition to do the work required of us."

An officer present said with some fervor that this was one of the results of the policy of the democratic House, which invited Indian defeats by cutting down the army.

General Sheridan said that of course his business was with the army, not with politics, and he did not wish to be understood as criticising any branch of the government. It was a question which admitted of no political construction, a question of the peace, the efficiency and the growth of the country, and that should interest democrats as well as republicans, and so long as they had army work to do they should have an army to do it, otherwise there would be these disasters.

Your correspondent asked if Red Cloud and Spotted Tail were with these Sioux.

The General said "No." His last advices from these chiefs showed that they were on good terms with the whites. "It is not these chiefs," he continued, "who make these wars, but the young men of the tribe. When peace or war is the question the Bucks will always go forth if the old chiefs try to sway them from it, but they lose their authority."

The General had an engagement to meet the Society of the Army of the Cumberland, and promised to see your correspondent at midnight and give him any additional news.

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL SHERMAN.

PHILADELPHIA, July 6, 1876.

General Sherman was found taking his ease in his inn, at the Transcontinental Hotel, with coats and boots thrown aside, sitting in an easy-chair by the window-side, fanning himself. He received the HERALD correspondent with his usual simple courtesy, and anticipated that gentleman's own words by asking.

"Is it true? What news have you got? What about Custer?"

The correspondent told him that nothing further had been received than had been published, and asked his opinion of the truth of the despatch.

"It seems almost too terrible to be entirely true. It must be exaggerated. I cannot believe that Custer and his whole command would be swept away. I don't think there were enough Indians there to do it like that. I'll bet,'" said the old warrior earnestly, "that if it is so there was a pile of dead on the Indian side. Custer's line of march, however, was to be just as the report says, and that tends to confirm it."

"What is the latest official information you have as to the situation there?"

"General Terry left Fort Abe Lincoln, striking for the Powder River and the valley of the Yellowstone. A boat was sent at the same time up through the Yellowstone with provisions and supplies. He encountered no Indians, and reported all well on the 21st of June, when he received a messenger from General Gibbon, informing him that Gibbon was on his way from Fort Ellis to meet him, but could not cross the Yellowstone, because the stream was too high to ford, and that Gibbon intended to send Custer up the Rosebud to its source with instructions to cross the country to the Little Horn, which he was to follow to where it joined the Big Horn, twenty miles from the Yellowstone. By way of this detour he was to come back to the Yellowstone, striking it at the Big Horn junction, which Gibbon could have reached by that time. This battle is reported just where Custer would have been likely to be. The steamboat would have gone up after Gibbon had used it to bring over his troops at the mouth of the Big Horn."

GENERAL SHERMAN'S EXPLANATION.

General Sherman explained that Terry started from Fort Lincoln with 1,500 men to march to the junction of the Big Horn with the YellowStone (a distance of about 400 miles from Fort Buford), where he was to meet Gibbon, with 500 men, coming from Helena, by way of Ellis, the nearest post, Ellis being 200 miles from the Big Horn junction. Custer left Terry at the Rosebud river, with a full regiment of 1,200 men, to make a detour around by the Little Horn. It was near where the Little Horn empties into the Big Horn that he was surprised by the Indians and the massacre took place. This is only about twenty miles from the Yellowstone, where Gibbon and Terry were waiting for him to join them, so that they were a few hours' march of Custer's command when the massacre occurred. Where Crook's battle took place, described in to-day's HERALD, cannot be much more than 100 miles from where Custer was killed, according to General Sherman's calculation.

"One reason why I think the account published is exaggerated," said the General, "is because we have yet received no official information. It would be the duty of the officer in command at Ellis, even if he were only a sergeant—for only a small garrison would be there, General Gibbon taking the cavalry at this post with him—I say the first duty of the officer left in command of this garrison would be to telegraph to Bozeman City, in Montana, 150 miles distant; thence to Montana City, 350 miles away. The despatch would be sent first to General Sheridan, who would forward it at once to me."

Even while the General was finishing this sentence there was a rap at the door, and a telegram was brought to him. It was from General Sheridan, announcing that the death of Custer was confirmed, but that no details were yet received. The despatch further stated that Terry was at the junction of the Big Horn, and was "all right." General Sherman inferred from the last assertion that Terry had Custer's wounded, and that in a very short time we shall have the full story of the battle from their lips.

MANNER OF FIGHTING.

The HERALD correspondent asked why Custer was ordered to make the detour up the Rosebud.

The General replied that it was frequently done in fighting Indians. "It is the best plan to divide so as to try and find their camp. The Indians rarely fight near their camps, where they leave their women and old men to guard their property. If you can surprise their camp and get the women and property out you soon get the men and bring them to terms. We conquered the Kiowas and the Comanches in the same way. We hemmed them in and caught them by finding their camps. There were good military reasons for Custer making this detour. He probably had his own good reasons for weakening his force by sending Major Reno around the Indian camp with seven companies. That was probably intended to cut off their retreat after the attack had been made."

"How many Sioux do you think there are in that country, and what kind of land is it, physically?"

"It is *mauvaises terres*, the worst kind of bad land. It is full of ravines, barren and water washed, poor soil, but with a little grass in the valleys. As to the numbers of Sioux there we have but little means of knowing, but, I think, there can't be more than 1,000."

REASONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN.

"What were the reasons for this campaign?"

"That is something I am very anxious you should say to the HERALD, because I want it understood. We are doing this at the special request of the Indian Department. It does not originate with the War Department at all. You will see on my map where the Indian Reservation is. Our purpose is to drive these Indians, who are of the very wildest and most savage sort, down on the reservation. Montana," said the General, enthusiastically, "is the most promising of our Territories. It is settled by an intelligent people, among whom are many old soldiers, and it is the richest and most promising of our settlements. These Indians have been annoying the settlers, and we are to drive them down on the reservation. You can say that we will do it now, or exterminate them."

Speaking of the character of the soldiers the General said that the officers of Crook's, Terry's and Gibbons' armies are the best Indian fighters in the service. "General Crook has had thirty years' experience in Indian wars, and he suppressed the troubles in Arizona, Washington Territory and Idaho. The HERALD is too severe in its criticism to-day."

THE NEWS IN WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1876.

A thrill of horror ran through the whole community here to-day when the news was received that General Custer and his officers and command of five companies had been slaughtered in their engagement with the Sioux Indians on the Little Horn River. At first the news was discredited at the War Department, where no despatches had been received as late as three o'clock. The officers on duty at the Adjutant General's office shook their heads and said that as no advices had been received from Lieutenant General Sheridan or any of the officers in the West, the whole thing looked improbable. It was not until a half hour later that a despatch was received by Mr. Crosby, Chief Clerk of the War Department, from Adjutant General R. C. Drum, of Lieutenant General Sheridan's staff, at Chicago, confirming the terrible news, as reported in the Western papers.

The following is the text of

THE DESPATCH:—

CHICAGO, July 6, 1876—1:15 P.M.

H. B. CROSBY, War Department, Washington, D.C.:

Despatch from General Terry, dated from his camp at mouth of Big Horn, July 2, confirms the newspaper reports of a fight on the 25th of June on the Little Big Horn and of Custer's death. Terry had fallen back to his present camp. I have sent full despatches to the Lieutenant General, who will probably communicate them. I have not yet received General Terry's report of the action or a list of the casualties.

R. C. DRUM, A. A. G.

This despatch was the acknowledgement of a despatch from General Terry's camp at the mouth of the Big Horn, dated July 2, received at Lieutenant General Sheridan's headquarters in Chicago. This told of General Terry's consequent reverse. Also, in so far as he had to fall back to his old camp on the river, which was an instant result of the massacre of the brave Custer and his gallant soldiers. A feeling of sadness took possession of everybody, while frequent tributes of praise were paid the memory of General Custer as a sterling and dashing officer. His magnificent record was gone over while some gravely gave expression to their apprehensions that the sweeping calamity met by him and his command was attributable to his recklessness of life and gallant but rash daring.

A DESPATCH TO THE PRESIDENT.

The President, a few moments later, received a duplicate despatch announcing the sad fate of Custer, and was very much concerned at the calamity which our little army had suffered in one of its bravest commanders and choicest as well as most experienced body of cavalry fighters on the Plains. As is well known, Custer took boundless pride and had unlimited confidence in his favorite troopers of the Seventh cavalry, while they, in turn, were known to be willing to go whereever he would lead and to have the greatest faith in their commander. Throughout the whole army on the frontier this has been recognized, and no body of troops had any closer tie with their superior officer than existed between General Custer and the Seventh cavalry. For a long time the progress of the pending Indian campaign has been closely watched with great concern, and misgivings were had at the War Department, and even General Sherman and his experienced staff, some of whom are familiar with severe and desperate Indian fighting, have felt

GRAVE APPREHENSIONS

for the fate of the small but intrepid columns sent out to fight the best fighting Indian warriors of the whole West. It has been variously estimated by frontiersmen and the most experienced officers that the Indians could mount effectively, when on the war path, from 2,000 to 8,000 braves. Lieutenant General Sheridan, to use his own words to a HERALD correspondent on the Plains in the Southwest two years ago, when the Kiowas and Comanches were on the warpath, said he was "determined to give the Sioux a thrashing." The present movement is a fulfilment of his resolve, but how far he has yet gone toward carrying it out the public will judge from the recent conduct of hostilities by the bravest and best officers of the army in Crook, Ferry, Custer, Gibbons and Reno. The Sioux, besides being a numerous, fearless and determined tribe of many bands, namely—the Lower and Upper Yanctonnais, the Unc-pa-pas, Blackfeet and Ogallallas—have strong allies among the Arapahoes and Cheyennes, the latter being among the best trained and disciplined, as well as most warlike and proud-spirited of the Northwestern Indians. They are also called the "dog soldiers," their Indian name being supposed to be a corruption of the French word "*chien*," and to have been assigned to them because, as Indian legendry tells, they used dogs in the winter snows to transport themselves from place to place. They have been known to traverse the length of the Continent, from north to south, in warlike spirit, and two years ago they sent couriers more than 1,000 miles to the Kiowas and Comanches to encourage them to war, saying that if they would make a good stand against the white man, and drive him out of their country, as they had done, the Cheyennes would send a large number of warriors to help them out. Thus it will be seen that, owing to martial spirit and ability, fostered and encouraged by imposing numbers, the present war in the Northwest promises to be

STILL MORE DISASTROUS,

unless larger bodies of troops can be sent to engage them, and may result in the depopulation by massacre or fear of the many advanced frontier towns. The Ogallallas, at last count, in August, 1875, numbered, according to Indian Agent Saville's report, 10,330; the Northern Cheyennes, 2,138; Northern Arapahoes, 1,565, while many of the northern Indians refused to be counted.

The sending of a mere handful of troops, however brave and invincible, to compete with a horde of bloodthirsty savages, is regarded here as preposterous, and some who discuss it about the hotels speak of it as criminal. One gentleman said that:—

"The sending of Custer off with his detachment was like putting a squad of men before a park of artillery to withstand being blown to pieces by the sheer resistance of their bodies."

IN CONGRESS.

The butchery of Custer and his men was very freely talked about in both Houses of Congress to-day, and has occasioned the most intense excitement and interest. Here, too, the frightful story was deemed incredible, and among the better informed was set down as the crazed narrative of a demoralized scout who had not gotten over a fright or stampede. The pending bill for the transfer of the Indians to the War Department has been given much more favorable consideration in the light of to-day's news, and the appropriations for the Sioux tribes will, perhaps, be reconsidered and reduced. Reference is also made to the killing of Canby by the Modocs, the carnage experienced by Captain McClellan's command near the Washita River, Indian Territory, and other similar occasions of slaughter.

THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

Secretary of War Cameron returned late this evening to Washington and immediately called upon the President, from whom, he says, all that he ascertained in regard to the massacre of Custer and his troops was what is conveyed in the despatch of Assistant Adjutant General Drum to Chief Clerk Crosby, of the War Department. He thought that no later information had been received by the War Department or it would have been forwarded to his residence. After examining what telegrams were on his table he said that there was nothing further from the fight up to midnight. It is understood that instructions will be given to send reinforcements at once to the troops in the field, and possibly some steps taken to provide a volunteer organization of 3,000 or 4,000 men at once. General Sherman's staff are also without any advices additional to the despatch to Mr. Crosby.

ANXIETY OF FRIENDS.

During the day many persons who were related to the men and officers of Custer's column called at the War Department to inquire for further particulars and details of the startling news; but owing to the absence of the Secretary of War with the General of the Army at Philadelphia, and the fact that no communications had been received from the West, the solicitous inquirers could obtain no information nor derive any consolation at the War Office. One of the officers on duty said that possibly Lieutenant General Sheridan was holding back the worst of the news so as to not demoralize public opinion. Up to five P. M. he had not communicated with them or the President, though a despatch to the War Department from his Assistant Adjutant General, Colonel Drum, intimated that the particulars had been telegraphed in full to the Lieutenant General who, he presumed, would give them to the President.

Every one here who knows anything of Indian fighting looks for trouble for the columns of Terry, Crook and Griffin.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SITTING BULL.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1876.

Among the many ghastly souvenirs preserved at the Army Medical Museum of this city is an autobiography of Sitting Bull, gotten up in the highest style of the art of savage picture history and telling, in fifty-five drawings or sketches, the story of his life down to the year 1870. Each picture is rudely outlined with ink, the men, horses and other objects being such as children would make. Many of them are partly filled in with red and blue colors, as if Sitting Bull had at some time got possession of one of the red and blue pencils so well known in newspaper offices, and with it elaborated his pictorial efforts. Blood or a wound is indicated by a red blotch with streamers falling down from it. The blue is used generally in indicating the white man's pantaloons. Each picture is made on a sheet of paper eight by ten inches, and is pasted into a book of blank leaves, such as are used for a scrap book. By holding the sheets up to the light it is seen that they are the muster roll blanks of the Thirty-first United States infantry, of which Colonel De Trobriand was the commandant. The papers probably fell into Sitting Bull's hands at the evacuation of a camp, or, as is more likely, were stolen by him during a visit to some of our outposts. Sitting Bull is not at all modest in committing to posterity the

STORY OF HIS GREAT DEEDS.

Whether it be the scalping of a soldier in battle or the sly theft of a mule, he brags equally of his prowess in his curious autobiography. This literary work, which is now likely to be famous, fell into the hands of Assistant Surgeon James C. Kimball, of the army, in the month of August, 1870, while he was stationed at Fort Buford, Dakota Territory. He had the pictures translated and sent them, with the translation and an index, to the Curator of the Army Medical Museum, Washington, Surgeon George A. Otis, United States Army, who has filed them in book shape, among the archives of the Museum. The introduction, written by Dr. Kimball, goes on to say that the autobiography contains a description of the principal adventures in the life of Sitting Bull, who is an Unk-pa-pa Chief. It was sketched by himself in the picture language in common use with the Indians. Since the establishment of Fort Buford, in 1866, Sitting Bull, at the head of from sixty to seventy warriors, had been the terror of mail carriers, wood choppers and small parties in the vicinity of the post and from 100 to 200 miles from it either way, up and down the Missouri River. During the time from 1866 to 1870, when the biography was written, this band had several times captured and destroyed the mail, and had stolen and run off over 200 head of cattle and killed near a score of white men in the immediate vicinity of the fort. The Unk-pa-pas are a tribe of the great Sioux nation living in the Yellowstone and Powder River countries.

STORY OF THE BOOK.

The book was brought into Fort Buford by a Yanktonnais Sioux and offered for sale and purchased for $1 50 worth of provisions. The Indian gave conflicting statements regarding the manner in which he came into possession of the book, exciting suspicion that he had stolen it from Sitting Bull, who, in his turn, undoubtedly stole the book in blank from the whites. An index has been prepared by the assistance of Indians and interpreters explanatory of the drawings. The word "coup," which occurs frequently in the index, has been appropriated by the Sioux from the French. "Counting coup" signifies the striking of an enemy, either dead or alive, with a stick, bow, lance or other weapon. The number of "coups" counted are enumerated along with the number of horses stolen and scalps taken in summing up the brave deeds of a warrior. The following is the index prepared by Dr. Kimball, descriptive of each picture or scene in Sitting Bull's life:—

THE INDEX.

No. 1. Sitting Bull, a young man without reputation and therefore wearing no feather, engages in his first battle and charges his enemy, a Crow Indian, who is in the act of drawing his bow, rides him down and strikes him with a "coup" stick.

Sitting Bull's autograph, a buffalo bull sitting on his haunches, is inscribed over him. His shield suspended in front has on it the figure of an eagle which he considers his medicine, in the Indian sense of the term.

No. 2. Sitting Bull, wearing a war bonnet, is leader of a war party who take a party of Crows, consisting of three women and a man, so completely by surprise that the man has not time to draw his arrows from the quiver. Sitting Bull kills one woman with his lance and captures another, the man meanwhile endeavoring to drag him from his horse; from which it is supposed he is forced to desist by others of the war party.

The fate only of Sitting Bull and his victims is given in this history.

No. 3. Sitting Bull pursuing his enemy, a Crow Indian, whom he strikes with his lance.

No. 4. Lances a Crow woman.

No. 5. Lances a Crow Indian.

No. 6. Sitting Bull twice wounded and unhorsed; his enemy, a Crow, at length killed by a shot in the abdomen and his scalp taken and hung to Sitting Bull's bridle.

No. 7. In an engagement with the Crows Sitting Bull mortally wounds one of the enemy, and, dropping his lance, rides up and strikes him with his whip. The lines and dashes in the picture represent the arrows and bullets that were flying in the air during the combat.

No. 8. Counts "coup" on a Gros Ventre de Prairie by striking him with his lance. Gros Ventre distinguished from Crow by manner of wearing the hair.

No. 9. Lances a Crow Indian.

No. 10. A Crow Indian attempts to seize Sitting Bull's horse by the bridle; Sitting Bull knocks him down with a "coup" stick, takes his scalp and hangs it to his bridle.

No. 11. Sitting Bull, with his brother mounted behind him, kills a white man, a soldier.

No. 12. Counts "coup" on a white man by hitting him with a "coup" stick.

No. 13. In a warm engagement with the whites, as shown by the bullets flying about, Sitting Bull shoots an arrow through the body of a soldier, who turns and fires, wounding Sitting Bull in the hip.

No. 14. Sitting Bull counts "coup" on a white man by striking him with his bow. Sitting Bull wears a jacket and bandanna handkerchief taken from some of his victims.

Nos. 15 to 22 are repetitions of No. 14, Sitting Bull in each counting "coup" on a white man.

No. 23. Sitting Bull shoots a frontiersman wearing a buckskin shirt, takes his scalp, which he hangs to his own bridle, and captures his horse. Sitting Bull wears a blanket.

No. 24. Sitting Bull strikes a white soldier with his "coup" stick, takes his scalp and his mule; wears a war shirt.

No. 25 counts "coup" on a soldier mounted, with overcoat on, gun slung across his back, by riding up and striking with his riding whip.

No. 26. Kills a white man and takes his scalp.

No. 27. Captures a mule and a scalp.

No. 28. In a warm engagement captures a horse and a scalp.

No. 29. Steals a mule.

No. 30. Captures two horses in action.

No. 31. Steals a horse.

No. 32. Steals and runs off a drove of horses from the Crows.

No. 33. In an engagement captures a government horse and mule and scalp.

No. 34. Steals a horse.

No. 35. Captures three horses and a scalp.

No. 36. Steals a drove of horses from the Crows.

No. 37. Steals a government horse.

No. 38. Steals a drove of horses from the Crows.

No. 39. In an engagement captures a mule. Sitting Bull first appears here as chief of the band of Strong Hearts, to which dignity his prowess has raised him. The insignia of his rank, a bow, having on one end a lance head, he carries in his hand.

No. 40. Sitting Bull, chief of the band of Strong Hearts, captures two horses in an engagement, in which his horse is wounded in the shoulder.

No. 41. Captures a horse in a fight.

No. 42. Steals a mule.

No. 43. Captures two horses in a fight, in which his horse is wounded in the leg.

No. 44. Mounted on a government horse captures a white man.

No. 45. Steals two horses.

No. 46. Captures four mules in a fight, in which his horse is wounded in the hip.

Nos. 47 and 48. Counts "coup" on white men.

No. 49. Steals a government horse.

No. 50. Fastens his horse to his lance, driven into the earth, and in a hand to hand fight kills a white man with his own gun. The black marks show the ground fought and trampled over.

No. 51. A fort into which his enemies, the Crows, have retreated, and from which they maintain a hot fire, through which Sitting Bull charges the fort.

No. 52. In a fight with the Crows Sitting Bull kills and scalps one Indian and counts "coup" on another, who flies at him, barely missing him.

No. 53. Steals a drove of mules.

No. 54. Sitting Bull, at the head of his band, charges into a camp of Crows and kills thirty of them. This happened in the winter of 1869-70.

No. 55. Kills one Crow and counts "coup" on two others, who run from him disgracefully.

AT GENERAL SHERIDAN'S HEADQUARTERS.

CHICAGO, July 6, 1876.

The news of the death of General Custer and the slaughter of his entire command by the Indians near the mouth of the Little Horn sent a thrill of horror throughout the city. At military headquarters all was confusion. General Sheridan was not in the city. Telegrams were being constantly received but most of them are of a confidential nature and withheld from publication.

The officers at headquarters give the following despatch, which was the last received here from Terry before the news of the massacre. It goes to confirm the move which Custer made, and would alone that the despatches need no further verification:—

CAMP ON THE NORTH ROSEBUD, June 21, 1876.

Lieutenant General P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Military Division of the Missouri, Chicago—

No Indians have been met with yet, but traces of a large and recent camp have been discovered twenty or thirty miles up the Rosebud. Gibbons' column will move this morning on the north side of the Yellowstone for the mouth of the Big Horn, where it will be ferried across by the supply steamer and whence it will proceed to the mouth of the Little Horn, and so on. Custer will go up the Rosebud to-morrow with his whole regiment, and thence to the headquarters of the Little Horn, thence down the Little Horn.

A. H. TERRY, Brigadier General Commanding.

THE NEWS CONFIRMED.

Custer broke camp on the 22d ult. on the North Rosebud, and moved as indicated above. At eleven o'clock this forenoon a despatch was received at Sheridan's headquarters confirming the first reports received. The despatch states that the forces were falling back, and that the wounded had been sent to Fort Lincoln. No details were given in this despatch, but the officers at headquarters regard it as full confirmation of the engagement reported.

A confidential despatch was received from General Terry, but beyond the fact that it embraced facts before the engagement no information was obtained.

A still later despatch from Lieutenant Kinzie, of the Seventh cavalry, was received, asking that he be transferred from the department where he is now on duty to the scene of action. This is also regarded as another confirmation of the bloody massacre reported.

OPINION OF OFFICERS.

It is the opinion at headquarters here, among those who are most familiar with the situation, that Custer struck Sitting Bull's main camp. General Drum thinks that General Crook fell upon but a part of it in his encounter. After the battle of the Rosebud Sitting Bull is known to have retreated in a northerly direction with the force that encountered Crook.

The astute Indian must have known that he was being gradually surrounded, and hence it was but natural that he should more and more concentrate his forces. No doubt Custer dropped squarely into the midst of no less than 10,000 red devils, and was literally torn to pieces.

An inquiry was made at headquarters as to whether Custer probably made the attack of his own accord, and an officer who has authority to answer such a question replied that it was entirely of his own volition. It was further stated that Terry ordered two columns, one of infantry and the other of cavalry, under Custer, to form a junction at a certain point on the Little Big Horn. Custer was ordered to move twenty or thirty miles a day. Instead of doing this he pushed through, and arrived at the point where the junction was to have been made a day or two in advance of the infantry. Then meeting the Indians, and probably desirous of punishing them, he made a dash upon their lines.

ARMY CRITICISMS.

Custer's movement is somewhat censured at Military Headquarters in this city. The older officers say it was brought about by that foolish pride which so often results in the defeat of men. It seems that a few days before General Terry had offered four additional companies to Custer, but that officer refused them. The information at Headquarters further is to the effect that General Gibbon, with his force, was known to be moving up to Custer for the purpose of reinforcing him, and the he (Custer) knew of this, and knew that Gibbon would arrive by the following day after the engagement, and yet, in the face of this knowledge, Custer, with a desire to eclipse Terry and wrest from that officer some of the spoils of a victory, rushed forward and was blindly led into the defiles and gorges of the Big Horn, where the Indians were concentrated.

Up to the closing of Headquarters no further news had been received than is given above. The officers are completely nonplussed at the tardiness, and are vainly puzzling their heads for a solution. It is believed that a serious mistake was made at Bismarck. What should have been sent by mail was sent by telegraph, and *vice versa*. The report that has come to Headquarters is the sort of stuff usually transmitted by mail and is so worded that General Terry took it for granted that when it reached the Lieutenant General he would be in possession of all the leading facts. Merely incidentally is the death of Custer touched upon, and then only in the way of regret at the loss of so brave an officer.

SKETCH OF THE CAMPAIGN.

DETROIT, Mich., July 6, 1876.

A letter received at the *Free Press* office from Surgeon McGillicuddy, of General Crook's command, dated at Fort Fetterman, June 21, four days before the engagement, says that the Indians, under Sitting Bull, the Northern chief, to the number of 3,000 warriors, consisting of the Ogallallas, the Red Cloud and Mission River agencies, Sioux, Arapahoes and Cheyennes, were encamped in two very large fortified villages near the mouth of Rosebud Creek, at its confluence with the Yellowstone, and twenty miles or more from the Little Big Horn River. The Indians were well armed and supplied with ammunition, which they had been accumulating for the last three years. It was reported that Lone Wolf was on his way North with 1,500 Northern Cheyennes to join the Sioux.

POSITION OF THE TROOPS.

General Crook, with the main body of the troops, 1,200 in number, and 270 Crow, Snake and Shoshone Indians, hereditary enemies of the Sioux, as scouts, and 104 six mule wagon teams, with supplies, was at the Permanent Supply Camp on Goose Creek, a tributary of Tongue River, which empties into the Yellowstone to the eastward of Rosebud Creek, in Montana, in the vicinity of west longitude 106, latitude 46 30. From the permanent supply camp to the Indian fortified village on Rosebud Creek was 120 miles by the practicable wagon route. The supply camp is fifteen miles northwest of the site of old Fort Phil Kearney. General Crook contemplated an immediate advance on the Indians. They were audacious, and on Friday, the 16th ult., had run off the last five head of beef from General Crook's command. The supply camp was known to be surrounded by Indians.

GENERAL TERRY'S COMMAND.

General Terry, accompanied by General Custer and General Gibbons, was encamped on the north side of the Yellowstone River, not many miles distant from the Indian village on Rosebud Creek. He had had frequent skirmishes with them and the week previous had sent two companies of infantry across the river to drive back the Indians, but the soldiers were repulsed and had to return. All this, of course, greatly emboldened the savages. At this time (June 21) all the horses belonging to one company of cavalry were reported as drowned in the Yellowstone. General Gibbons was instructed to prevent, if possible, the escape of the hostile Indians north across Dakota into British America. General Carr, with eight companies of the Fifth cavalry, was to have left Fort Laramie on the morning of June 22 to scout in the country east of the Big Horn River and prevent the Sioux from going south.

BUFFALO BILL.

He had with him as a scout, W. F. Cody, "Buffalo Bill," who recently left the stage to join his old command. During the last night of his appearance as an actor at Cheyenne Spotted Tail was a spectator at the Opera House and scrutinized William very closely. His long hair will be a great attraction for the savages. From the letter of Surgeon McGillicuddy the situation on the morning of the 25th, the day of the battle, may be sketched as follows:—

BEFORE THE BATTLE.

The Indians had evidently left their fortified village on Rosebud Creek and retreated to the Little Big Horn River, having that stream as a protection in their front and the Rosebud Mountains as a shelter in their rear. The Little Big Horn flows north into the Big Horn River, which is a confluent of the Yellowstone, uniting with the latter stream at Fort Pease, to the westward of the fortified village on Rosebud Creek. To the south of the Indian position, some twenty or more miles, was the permanent supply camp of General Crook. General Gibbons was north of the Indians, upon the Yellowstone, some distance to the northward. General Carr was sixty or eighty miles to the westward and rapidly approaching the Indians with his eight companies of cavalry, when Custer, pursuing the valley of the Big Horn and Little Big Horn rivers, was intent on cutting off the retreat of the Indians to the westward or forming a junction with General [illegible] south of him or with General Gibbons north [illegible] most likely the latter. All the locations [illegible] south of the Yellowstone River and among [illegible] ranges composing the Black Hills. The [illegible] operations is sixty miles south of the Y[illegible] about the same distance east of the [illegible] the assumed advanced position of [illegible] alry. From this sketch it will b[illegible]